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The Battle of Poelcappelle marked the end of highly successful British attacks during the Battle of Passchendaele. Pitting the attacking forces against relatively intact German defences in rain and muddy conditions like those in August, the main attack was a failure and only the diversionary attack managed to gain any ground. Unfortunately, the failure of the main attack was not transmitted back to the Army Commanders, resulting in the next attack (the First Battle of Passchendaele) being poorly planned.
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After the Battle of Broodseinde on 4 October, the first of the 'Black Days' of the German army,[5] Field Marshal Douglas Haig believed that the opposing German forces were close to collapse (due in part to the large number of Germans who surrendered at Broodseinde). The troubles in the French Army stemming from the Nivelle offensive and the forthcoming French attack at Malmaison meant that the British GHQ needed to keep the initiative on the Western Front. Haig ordered General Hubert Gough commanding the British 5th Army, the 1st French Army commanded by General François Anthoine under his command and General Herbert Plumer commanding the British 2nd Army, to continue their attacks with the intention of capturing the Passchendaele Ridge and starting a general offensive to capture the Belgian coast.
The weather had turned against the Allies, with over 30 millimeters of rain falling between 4 and 9 October (compared to a monthly average of 75 millimeters),[6] turning ground churned by artillery fire into fields of mud deep enough for a man to drown in, hindering the movement of artillery forward after the Battle of Broodseinde Ridge and (by stopping aerial observation) dramatically reducing the effectiveness of Allied artillery.
Despite the change in weather, Haig (with the agreement of his Army commanders)[7] decided to continue the offensive, with the attack (to capture part of the Passchendaele Ridge) planned for 10 October advanced to 9 October and the subsequent attack to capture the rest of the Passchendaele Ridge (which became known as the 'First Battle of Passchendaele') planned for 13 October advanced to 12 October[8]
German defensive policy had been changed several times. From the Battle of Pilckem Ridge, the Germans had strongly held lines behind outpost zones, with numerous fortifications with machine-guns between the defensive lines intended to disorganise the attacking force, to separate infantry from their creeping barrage, supported by counter-attack forces held to the rear.[9]
The Battle of Menin Road and the Battle of Polygon Wood revealed that British artillery was able to stop the German counter-attack forces. Coupled with the lightly held areas between the defensive lines (which had been captured), this meant that the attacking British forces were able to capture and hold the outlying zones reasonably easily. To stop this, more German forces were concentrated in the forward positions.[10] While this had disastrous effect for German forces in the Battle of Broodseinde, where British artillery was able to overwhelm the increased numbers of troops in the front areas, destroy some of the outlying fortifications and protect British infantry as they outflanked the remainder, captured them and then destroyed the German counter-attacks; in the Battle of Poelcappelle some of these British advantages were lost, because of the rainy weather and transport difficulties behind the new front line. Much less counter-battery fire and destructive fire on barbed wire and pill-boxes was possible before the attack, the moves forward of British artillery was severely delayed and many guns were out of action. Faced with this the German defence was able to contain the British advance and recapture much of the ground lost on 9 September later in the day.[11]
The British objective was to gain control over Passchendaele Ridge. This ridge ran south then south west from the village of Passchendaele overlooking the Ypres Salient, especially the new positions gained around Broodseinde. Harington, Plumer's Chief of Staff
Moving back to the Westhoek—Pilckem Ridge would suit the attritional nature of the campaign but negate the opportunity to close the German supply route north at Roulers and the coast clearing operation dependent on it in 1918. The British could winter on Passchendaele Ridge and jump off from there in the spring. Byng, preparing his attack at Cambrai wanted the Germans to remain pinned in Flanders. Events on the French front, in Italy and Russia also indluenced Haig's decision.[13]
An attack over a frontage of 13,500 yards (12,300 m)[14] was planned to capture the ridge in two stages, an attack in the morning to beyond half way to the objective; if this caused a general withdrawal by the Germans, the reserve brigades of the attacking divisions would then advance to the objective in the afternoon.[15] To the north a supporting attack by the Fifth Army was arranged. XVIII Corps would advance 1,200 yards up Poelkappelle spur towards Passchendaele Ridge near Westroosebeke. XIV Corps and the French 1st Army would close up to the edge of Houthoulst Forest. To the south on the Gheluvelt Plateau, X Corps was to attack towards Becelaere and Gheluvelt. Raids and artillery bombardments were arranged along the rest of the front to try to deceive the Germans as to the objectives of the attacks.[16]
The preparation to the battle was inadequate. Rather than the 6 to 8 days (in fine weather) to prepare for the attack, only 3 days (in poor weather with a resulting increase in transport difficulties due to so much mud) were allowed.[17]
This resulted in a majority of the artillery units being unable to move from the positions they had occupied during the preceding Battle of Broodseinde Ridge (and so were firing at extreme range, with a loss of accuracy). It was so difficult to move the artillery that only 25 pieces assigned to the 66th Division were ready for the battle instead of the usual 90.[18]
The poor weather meant that aerial observation was not possible and so the German artillery positioned behind the Passchendaele Ridge and Gheluvelt Plateau were not detected and subjected to counter battery fire.[19] The bombardment of wire entanglements (to cut them and allow the attacking troops to assault the fortifications) was inadequate in areas where there was no direct observation.[20]
The main attack, conducted by the II Anzac Corps of 2nd Army with the British 66th and 49th Divisions and supported by the I Anzac Corps with 2nd Australian Division aimed at an advance of between 600 yards (550 m) and 800 yards (730 m) by the II Anzac Corps to the outer edge of the village of Passchendaele,[21] with the 2nd Australian Division supporting this attack by pivoting on its right side and advancing on its left side.
While the 2nd Australian and the 49th Divisions were veteran units, the 66th Division had only arrived in France recently[4] and was not in the line prior to the attack.
The move up of the 66th Division was a disaster. Needing to move 4 kilometers in 10 hours, due to the mud much of the Division was still moving to the front line when the attack started at 5:20 am. When the Australian 2nd Division attacked, their left flank (where the 66th Division was supposed to be) was open, resulting in severe casualties. The 2nd Australian Division only achieved their first objective (the "red" line) and was then forced back to its start line by German counterattacks.
The 66th Division fared better in its attack, managing to take most of its first objective and part of its second objective (the "blue" line). The units on the blue line mistook movement of 197th Brigade of the 66th Division as a withdrawal (it was swinging back both flanks to link with the neighbouring 49th Division*) and as a result the troops in the centre withdrew to the first objective.[22]
The 49th Division managed to take most of its first objective and then ran into undamaged wire entanglements on the Bellevue Spur.[22] After a failed attack on the defenses behind the wire entanglements, the 49th Division withdrew to its first objective.
After numerous German counterattacks during the night, the final positions of the attacking divisions except near Reutel, opposite Passchendaele and near Houthoulst Forest were the same as their starting positions. The German Official History considered that the success was costly and that '... the sufferings of the troops bore no relation to the advantage obtained.'[23]
The reasons for the failure were many: the troops were exhausted from either their time on the line or from moving up to the front; the artillery preparatory fire was inadequate, resulting in the assaulting troops being subjected to German artillery fire and being stopped by uncut barbed wire.
There were diversionary attacks both to the north and south of the main attack. In the south British X Corps (5th and 7th Divisions) made minor gains on Gheluvelt Plateau.[20] Raids were carried out by the 1st Australian Division at Celtic Wood (with disastrous results – 71 of the 85 raiders becoming casualties).[24]
In the north an offensive by units of the 1st French Army (2nd Infantry Division), British XIV Corps (Guards Division, 29th and 4th Divisions) and the British XVIII Corps (11th and 48th Divisions) was more successful. The First French Army and XIV Corps managed to advance 800 yards (730 m) to the southern fringe of Houthulst Forest.[20] XVIII Corps managed to advance an average of 100 yards (91 m) and 200 yards (180 m), despite the 11th Division being aided by 2 sections of tanks (8 tanks) of the Tank Corps's D Battalion.
There were 5 Victoria Crosses awarded during the Battle of Poelcappelle, three to soldiers of the 29th Division (Private Frederick George Dancox, Sergeant John Molyneux and Sergeant Joseph Lister), one to a soldier of the Guards Division (Lance-Sergeant John Harald Rhodes) and one to a soldier of the 11th Division (Corporal William Clamp).
While some of the attacking troops had succeeded in forcing back the Germans and holding their gains, these gains were minor compared to the losses in personnel. This can be attributed to the wet weather on the ground behind the British front line, leaving insufficient time to prepare the attack. The Germans were also hampered but as their positions were on the edge of the beaten zone, approaches to their front line were easier except for the last stage,
The strain of the battle on the Germans was reflected in a Fourth Army order by General Sixt von Armin of 11 October
but the German infantry had managed to hold on despite these difficulties.
Poor communications worsened by the weather and German artillery fire also led to the failure at the First Battle of Passchendaele on 12 October as the attempt to exploit German disorganisation and falling morale meant that insufficient time for adequate artillery and supply preparations was available.